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Litigation Finance:  What Do 
Judges Need to Know? 
BERT I. HUANG* 
In any future case in this district such an agreement must be revealed to 
the court and members of the class as soon as possible.  A “sunshine” rule 
is essential to protect the interests of the public, the class, and the honor of 
the legal profession.1  
In our classic image of an American lawsuit, including class 
actions, the plaintiff’s lawyer pays the upfront costs and then 
hopes to recoup them from a share of the winnings.  But today, 
this picture is incomplete.  It is no longer only the law firm’s own 
war chest that finances a case — so can outside investors and 
lenders.2  As Judge Hellerstein has just reminded us, the 9/11 
  
 * Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  I thank Judge Jack Weinstein 
for the invitation to speak at his conference on mass litigation (this essay grew from my 
remarks); and I am grateful to our fellow panelists Elizabeth Cabraser, Jack Coffee, Ken 
Feinberg, Judge Alvin Hellerstein, and Amy Shulman for their reactions.  I also thank 
Scott Hemphill, Judge Gerard Lynch, Josh Picker, and Judge Jed Rakoff for their insight-
ful comments.  John Briggs and Courtney Heavey offered superb research assistance. 
 1. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452, 1453–54 (E.D.N.Y. 
1985), rev’d, 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1987).  This was Judge Weinstein’s exhortation in a 
class action which, as he reminds us, was “partially financed through funds advanced by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys who did not perform any legal work.”  Jack B. Weinstein, The Democ-
ratization of Mass Actions in the Internet Age, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451, 468 
(2012).  The Second Circuit agreed that “in all future class actions counsel must inform 
the court of the existence of a fee sharing agreement at the time it is formulated.”  Agent 
Orange, 818 F.2d at 226 (2d Cir. 1987).  With the rise of investments in lawsuits by hedge 
funds, banks, and other outside investors, Judge Weinstein now also urges that “the court 
should be made aware of any third-entity financing arrangements as soon as possible.”  
Weinstein, supra, at 468 (emphasis added). 
 2. For recent surveys and analyses, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: 
Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 339–42 (2010); Deborah R. Hen-
sler, Future of Mass Litigation, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306 (2011); Jonathan T. Molot, 
Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65 (2010); 
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cases he presided over involved such third-party financing.3  The 
Ecuadorian plaintiffs’ environmental case against Chevron, now 
pending in the Southern District of New York, is another promi-
nent example in the news.4  
Although such investments are usually confidential, the use of 
“alternative litigation financing” or “third-party litigation fund-
ing” in the United States appears to be growing.5   Specialty firms 
are multiplying.6  Hedge funds and major banks are also getting 
involved.7  Credit Suisse, for instance, recently spun off its “litiga-
tion risk strategies” division into a standalone litigation financing 
firm.8  And Citigroup backed Counsel Financial, the lender in 
  
Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?  Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. 
L. REV. 1268 (2011); Steven Garber, Alternative Litigation Financing in the United States: 
Issues, Knowns, and Unknowns, RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST. (2010), 
http://www.rand.org/ !content/ !dam/ !rand/ !pubs/ !occasional_papers/ !2010/ !RAND_OP306.pdf.  
This essay’s focus excludes consumer loans or cash advances to cover a plaintiff’s living 
costs or business expenses while litigation continues. 
 3. See Alvin K. Hellerstein, Democratization of Mass Tort: Presiding over Mass Tort 
Litigation to Enhance Participation and Control by the People Whose Claims Are Being 
Asserted, 45 COLUM. J.L. SOC. PROBS. 473, 473–75 (2012). 
 4. See Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 9, 2012, at 
38, 43 (describing Ecuadorian plaintiffs’ third-party funding); Roger Parloff, Have You Got 
a Piece of This Lawsuit?, CNN MONEY (June 28, 2011, 2:06 PM), 
http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/ !2011/ 06/ !28/ have-you-got-a-piece-of-this-lawsuit.     
 5. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Betting on Justice: Putting Money on Lawsuits, 
Investors Share in the Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at A1 (noting that large banks, 
hedge funds, and investors are looking to lawsuits as new investment vehicles); Paul M. 
Barrett, Lawsuit Finance Moves Up the Food Chain, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 16, 
2012, at 42 (discussing rise of “sophisticated investment outfits” that “specialize in making 
bets on bigger-dollar cases”); Brandon Pierson, Ethics Opinion Urges Wariness in Dealing 
with Lawsuit Funding, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 2010, at 1 (noting ethical considerations that 
may accompany the increase in third-party lawsuit funding); Nate Raymond, Attorneys 
Explore Third-Party Funding in Commercial Disputes, N.Y. L.J., June 3, 2010, at 1 (dis-
cussing growth of sophisticated third-party funding of commercial litigation); see also 
Timeline: Legal Path to Lawsuit Lending, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/ ! interactive/ !2010/ !11/ !13/ !business/ !20101113_ !lawsuit_timeline.ht
ml (charting history of lawsuit funding). 
 6. See, e.g., Garber, supra note 2, at 11 tbl.1, 14 tbl.2, 15 tbl.3 (listing litigation fi-
nancing firms active in the United States); Hensler, supra note 2, at 321 tbl.8 (categoriz-
ing “High-End Third-Party Funders”). 
 7. See, e.g., Appelbaum, supra note 5 (identifying lawsuit financed by a $3.5 million 
loan from a New York hedge fund). 
 8. Jennifer Smith, Credit Suisse Parts with Litigation Finance Group, WALL ST. J. L. 
BLOG (Jan. 9, 2012, 6:13 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ !law/ !2012/ !01/ !09/ !credit-suisse-parts-
with-litigation-finance-group/ !; Ross Todd, Credit Suisse Litigation Finance Unit Spins Off 
to Form Parabellum Capital, AM. LAWYER, Jan. 10, 2012, 
http://www.law.com/ !jsp/ !tal/ !PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202538125544.  
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Judge Hellerstein’s 9/11 cases.9  The structure of the financing is 
also becoming more creative; ideas are crossing over from Great 
Britain and Australia, where third-party litigation funding has a 
longer history.10  A variety of schemes, including some so-called 
“loans” that are in effect equity stakes in the outcome of the case, 
are already in use. 
How might such outside financing affect the governance of 
mass litigation?  Consider the familiar worry about potential con-
flicts of interest between plaintiffs and their attorneys, under typ-
ical contingency fee arrangements.  To this already difficult 
problem of ethics and incentives, third-party litigation financing 
adds a further dimension: it adds (yes) a third party.11  In aca-
demic parlance, it complicates the principal-agent problem by 
adding a new principal.12  Most obviously, if banks and hedge 
funds have interests at stake, they may well want some say in 
how the litigation is run, or in how and when it ends.  And it is 
easy to imagine other distortions in litigation governance, per-
haps affecting the selection of counsel or the choice to bring suit 
in the first place.  
One premise of today’s dialogue (as Judge Weinstein’s re-
marks emphasize) is that judges can and should take measures to 
reduce such distortions or even to resolve the conflicts of interest 
creating them.  This is an especially sensible and widely accepted 
premise in class actions.  Judges are given a formal set of useful 
  
 9. Appelbaum, supra note 5; Kirby Griffis, Follow the Money: Litigation Funders 
Back Your Foes, METRO. CORP. COUNS., July 2011, at 1, 6. 
 10. See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 2, at 320–23 (“Now, third-party litigation invest-
ment firms are entering the high end of the litigation market in the United States, 
spurred on in part by success in Australia and, more recently, England and Western Eu-
rope . . . .”); Richard Lloyd, The New, New Thing, AM. LAWYER (May 17, 2010), 
http://www.law.com/ !jsp/ !tal/ !PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202457711273 (discussing spread “of 
third-party litigation funding . . . around the world through Australia, Europe, and now 
the United States”).  Cf. David Abrams & Daniel Chen, A Market for Justice (2009) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with the author) (reviewing origins of litigation funding in 
Australia). 
 11. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 342–43 (discussing principal-agent relationships 
in third-party litigation funding). 
 12. For a sampling of the literature on principal-agent problems between attorneys 
and clients, including in class actions, see, e.g., Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweet-
heart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1377 (2000); Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805 
(1997); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class 
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Aligning the Interests 
of Lawyers and Clients, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 165 (2003). 
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tools — and obligations — for addressing conflicting interests in 
class actions, at least under the federal rules: not only must 
judges assess the adequacy of representation in deciding whether 
to certify a class, under Rule 23(a); but they are also tasked with 
selecting class counsel under Rule 23(g).  Moreover, class wide 
settlements must meet judicial approval, under Rule 23(e), and 
the terms to be approved include those allocating costs and attor-
neys’ fees.  Sharp observers have started to warn that “nontradi-
tional third-party funding for class actions . . . might raise new 
issues pertaining to adequacy of representation, appointment of 
class counsel, settlements, and legal fees.”13  In light of Rule 23, 
such an observation not only points to potential concerns but also 
reminds us of the safeguards already at hand.  
To use such tools most effectively, judges will need to under-
stand how outside financing might press against (or in favor of) 
the plaintiffs’ interests in any given case.  And the earlier the 
financing structure is understood, the better; as the Second Cir-
cuit observed, in disapproving the co-counsel financing scheme in 
the Agent Orange cases: 
[I]n all future class actions counsel must inform the court of 
the existence of a fee sharing agreement at the time it is 
formulated.  This holding may well diminish many of the 
dangers posed to the rights of the class.  Only by reviewing 
the agreement prospectively will the district courts be able 
to prevent potential conflicts from arising, either by disap-
proving improper agreements or by reshaping them with the 
assistance of counsel . . . .14  
What questions, then, should judges be asking when they con-
front a case involving third-party funding?  After decades of expe-
rience with contingency-fee class actions, the judiciary may have 
a good grasp of how to identify conflicting interests and other 
dangers, in that familiar setting.  But third-party funding is 
newer and more complex, involving investors who may have no 
duty to the class members and whose interests may diverge from 
those of both counsel and class.  Moreover, financing structures 
vary along many dimensions; some formats may entail worse 
  
 13. Hensler, supra note 2, at 322. 
 14. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 226 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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risks as a general matter, and even so, the actual distortions (and 
potential remedies) may yet turn on the specifics of the case.  
New lines of questioning are thus needed just to gather the raw 
factual matter to inform a court’s evaluation.  These will need to 
be refined by experience and refreshed over time as financing in-
novations continue to create new risks.  My aim here is only to 
suggest a starting point for this evolving inquiry. 
A. WHAT QUESTIONS SHOULD JUDGES ASK? 
Let me first suggest a few basic questions focused on the 
structure of the financing, on the funder’s degree of control over 
the conduct of litigation, and on how the funding affects asymme-
tries between the parties.  For convenience, I’ve styled these 
questions for plaintiff-side funding; but they can be easily recast 
to apply to financing for the defense side. 
The indispensable task is to uncover the precise metes and 
bounds of the competing incentives created by the financing 
structure.  Thus the first set of questions is aimed at piercing 
simplistic labels such as “loan” or “investment,” in order to reveal 
the actual structure of the funder’s stake in the outcome, and to 
see how it might create conflicting interests for the funders, the 
lawyers, and the parties at each stage of the litigation.  
1. Financing Structure 
¶  Who is funding the litigation?  Who arranged the funding?  
Who has been informed (or not) about the financing terms? 
¶  Does the financing flow to the lawyers or to the clients?15  Is 
it financing only a single case at the law firm or a portfolio of the 
firm’s cases?16  
  
 15. Garber, supra note 2, at 8 (“[T]here are three main kinds of [litigation funders] 
currently active . . . : (1) companies that provide consumers with legal funding, (2) compa-
nies that lend to plaintiffs’ law firms, and (3) companies that invest in commercial (i.e., 
business-against-business) claims on the plaintiff side.”).  Some litigation funders might 
choose to cater to defendants rather than plaintiffs.  Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1276. 
 16. See Griffis, supra note 9, at 6 (noting that plaintiffs’ firms can obtain a “single 
cash advance,” “a case cost line of credit,” or “an attorney line of credit, which the firm can 
use for anything it likes,” and that a “funding package consisting of an attorney line of 
credit secured by recovery rights in a firm’s whole inventory is rather difficult to distin-
guish from owning stock in the firm”).  
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¶  How will the funder be paid?  Is it taking interest pay-
ments, a share of the recovery, or both?  Whose portion of the re-
covery will be charged for this payment: the lawyers or the par-
ties? 
¶  Does the rate of return or the size of the funder’s stake de-
pend on the amount of recovery?  Does it depend on whether the 
remedy is injunctive or monetary?   
¶  What do the funders receive if there is no recovery?  If the 
funding is called a “loan,” is it recourse or non-recourse — and 
how is it secured?17  
¶  Does the rate of return or the size of the funder’s stake de-
pend on whether the outcome is a judgment or a settlement?  Do 
they depend on which stage of litigation is reached or how long it 
takes to achieve the outcome?  
¶  What share of the litigation costs is covered by the financ-
ing?  Is it a fixed amount?  If it is a variable amount, what does it 
depend on?  
¶  Does the funding occur in stages?18  What criteria deter-
mine whether the next stage will be reached?  What criteria allow 
the investor to exit?  
¶  Does the arrangement limit or anticipate further borrowing 
from or investments by other third parties?19   
¶  Is the funder in effect insuring the plaintiff?  If so, for what 
range of losses, with what effective deductibles, and at what ef-
fective premiums?20  
  
 17. Id.  (“The money is secured by the firm’s potential rights to recovery . . . ranging 
from the right to recovery in a particular case to the rights in a firm’s entire inventory of 
cases.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Litigation-Finance Contract Reveals How Investors Back 
Lawsuits, FORBES (June 7, 2011, 7:12 AM) (detailing Burford Group’s multi-stage financ-
ing of the Ecuadorian case against Chevron, with an initial investment of $4 million to be 
followed by two further “tranches” of $5 million each), 
http://www.forbes.com/ !sites/ danielfisher/ !2011/06/07/!litigation-finance-contract-reveals-
how-investors-back-lawsuits.  For further analysis of this contract, see Maya Steinitz, The 
Litigation Finance Contract (Univ. Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-11), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/ ! sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2049528. 
 19. For instance, does it include terms concerning a right of first refusal, or limiting 
dilution of the present investor’s stake? 
 20. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 341 (noting one view arguing that funders would 
be no more invasive than insurance companies already are); Molot, supra note 2, at 102–
03 (imagining the result of insurance providers being allowed to enter the legal market); 
Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1331–32 (comparing defense funding to after-the-event insur-
ance, but finding that plaintiff funding is analogous to a financing agreement). 
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¶  Does the financing arrangement otherwise affect the timing 
or amount of the lawyers’ or the party’s compensation? 
2. Influence on the Conduct of Litigation 
¶  Does the funder have formal control over any litigation de-
cisions?21  
¶  Does the funder have de facto influence over litigation deci-
sions — such as through the threat of withdrawing funding, or 
through conditions on offering funding in the first place?22   
¶  Does the funder have the power, formally or de facto, to set 
settlement terms?  Can it influence the acceptance, refusal, or 
timing of settlements?  
¶  Does the financing alter the counsel’s or the party’s incen-
tives to settle earlier?23  
¶  Has the funder in effect appointed the counsel?  If the fun-
der can influence the choice of counsel, does that translate into 
influence over the counsel’s actions?24 
¶  Has the funder, or the terms of financing, otherwise nar-
rowed the party’s choice of counsel?  Or to the contrary, has the 
availability of funds broadened the choice of counsel?25  
  
 21. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 340–41 (contrasting Australian funders’ practice of 
“making important litigation decisions” with current United States funders’ practice of not 
interfering); Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1279–80 (discussing Australian High Court deci-
sions permitting “third-party funding with the funder having broad powers to control the 
litigation”). 
 22. See, e.g., UNIV. OF OXFORD, INT’L CONFERENCE ON LITIG. FUNDING 23 (May 19, 
2010) (unpublished proceedings) [hereinafter OXFORD CONFERENCE] (“Sensitive situations 
arise when a funder places improper pressure on a party or lawyer in relation to terms of 
the arrangement, or in relation to when to accept a settlement or at what level, or decides 
to withdraw support inappropriately.”)  
 23. For a range of possibilities, see, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 342 (arguing that 
funders would lessen the incentive for contingency-fee attorneys to settle early); Molot, 
supra note 2, at 93–94 (noting potential for high effective interest rates to encourage 
plaintiffs to settle quickly); Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1320 (noting potential for certain 
financing arrangements to diminish litigants’ incentives to pursue their claims or defenses 
vigorously). 
 24. See OXFORD CONFERENCE, supra note 22, at 23 (“If a funder selects the lawyer, 
this may bring advantages of expertise and lower price, but might also increase potential 
for improper pressure.”). 
 25. For instance, financing may enable a party to hire counsel at billable rates rather 
than on a contingency fee.  See Raymond, supra note 5 (quoting attorney Louis Solomon’s 
explanation that third-party funding “has meant clients can hire Mr. Solomon and Cad-
walader [on an hourly fee basis] when they might otherwise have needed to engage some-
one with a different fee structure and not their first choice”).  I thank Josh Picker for 
bringing this story to my attention.  See Joshua Picker, Monitoring the Attorney-Agent: 
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3. Asymmetries Between Parties 
¶  Does the arrangement treat all plaintiffs under similar 
terms, or are some subsets favored over others?  For instance,  
are named plaintiffs treated differently from absentees?  Are 
members who actively opt in treated different from those who 
merely do not opt out?26 
¶  Does the financing work to counterbalance the defendant’s 
greater resources?27  Its greater tolerance for risk?  Its greater 
bargaining power?  Or to the contrary, does the financing exacer-
bate asymmetries that already favor the plaintiffs?28   
B. WHAT CAN JUDGES DO? 
A second group of questions tests the scope of a judge’s toolkit 
in a given case for uncovering, regulating, and potentially even 
harnessing third-party influences.  Which tools are more readily 
available may vary widely — by cause of action, for instance, or 
from court to court.  Thus, these questions may seem fanciful for 
some cases, but for others, they may prompt a closer look at how 
present safeguards can be adapted to new concerns arising from 
third-party funding. 
First comes the matter of uncovering the financing structure.  
Echoing the Second Circuit’s command in the Agent Orange liti-
gation,29 Judge Weinstein is now urging that “the court should be 
made aware of any third-entity financing arrangements as soon 
as possible” to allow “the court to better supervise the litigation” 
  
Third-Party Litigation Funding and the Agency Costs of Damages Class Actions (Dec. 20, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
 26. See infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 27. See, e.g., Molot, supra note 2, at 82–90 (arguing litigation finance would redress 
bargaining imbalances by countering effects of parties’ unequal risk tolerance). 
 28. In a given case, of course, the plaintiffs’ side may have the greater tolerance for 
risk or the greater bargaining power.  See, e.g., John Beisner et al., Selling Lawsuits, Buy-
ing Trouble: Third-Party Litigation Funding in the United States, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR 
LEGAL REFORM, 8 (Oct. 2009), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/ !sites/ !default/ !files/ !thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf 
(noting that “in the context of aggregate litigation . . . . third-party funding encourages 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to test claims of questionable merit, knowing that the enormity of the 
potential risk will often force defendants to settle . . . .”). 
 29. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 226 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[I]n all 
future class actions counsel must inform the court of the existence of a fee sharing agree-
ment at the time it is formulated.”). 
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and “to ensure that client interests are not compromised.”30  How 
might these disclosures be achieved? 
1. Disclosure of Financing 
¶  How might the court induce a party to disclose the terms of 
its financing?31  Or at least to disclose what share of an award or 
settlement will go to the funders?32  For instance, can the court 
direct a party to include such details in a motion for class certifi-
cation?  Or in the settlement notice to class members?  
¶  Where the terms of a financing agreement might reveal the 
weaknesses or the strategies of the funded party, should such 
disclosures be made in camera?33   
¶  Or to the contrary, should opposing counsel be allowed to 
pose questions about the financing?34  Can opposing counsel be 
expected to press the inquiry?35 
  
 30. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 470 (emphasis added). 
 31. One natural starting point is to consider those disclosures contemplated at each of 
the checkpoints of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  For instance, Rule 23(e) is under-
stood to require “parties seeking approval of a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or com-
promise under [Rule 23(e)] to file a statement identifying any agreement made in connec-
tion with the settlement.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(E) advisory committee’s note (referring to the 
current Rule 23(e)(3)).   This requirement aims “at related undertakings that, although 
seemingly separate, may have influenced the terms of the settlement by trading away 
possible advantages for the class in return for advantages for others.  Doubts should be 
resolved in favor of identification.”  Id.  This has been construed broadly “to encompass 
such matters as . . . division of fees among counsel” or the revelation of “additional funds 
that might have been paid to the class that are instead paid to selected claimants or their 
attorneys.” MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.631 (2004).  In some cases, 
such a “necessarily open-ended” inquiry, id., might be argued to encompass financial obli-
gations to third-party funders.  
 32. To consider one vivid illustration:  In a fee dispute arising from the 9/11 cases, 
Judge Hellerstein ordered plaintiffs’ counsel to absorb $6.1 million in interest payments 
for their third-party loans, rather than pass those costs through to their clients; he had 
raised doubts about “how well the clients were informed over the years of the expenses.”  
See Mireya Navarro, Judge Rejects $6.1 Million in 9/11 Case Legal Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
27, 2010, at A17. 
 33. As Judge Weinstein observes, in camera disclosure may be appropriate to avoid 
signaling “financial strain” to opposing parties. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 470.  At times, 
of course, other factors may override this consideration.  See, e.g., Parloff, supra note 4 
(describing Judge Lewis Kaplan’s order to disclose the details of third-party funding, 
among other materials, in the Ecuadorian plaintiffs’ case against Chevron). 
 34. That is, if such questions can be walled off from the merits.  I thank Judge Rakoff 
for the insight that (in this regard) defense counsel may well have an informational ad-
vantage over the judge.  Note that, in theory, such expertise could be useful even if the 
actual inquiry occurs in camera; one might imagine that defense counsel could be allowed 
to suggest questions for the judge (but not be privy to the answers). 
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¶  How might the use of such methods of disclosure influence 
the terms of financing in future cases?  
2. Regulation of Influence 
¶  How might the court take financing structures into account 
when choosing lead attorneys, such as under Rule 23(g) for fed-
eral class actions?36  Or when choosing lead plaintiffs to monitor 
the litigation, such as under the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act?37  
¶  How might the court take financing structures into account 
when deciding whether to certify a class action — for instance, in 
its “adequacy” inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) for federal class ac-
tions?  Or when defining the class or the class claims to be certi-
fied under Rule 23(c)(1)(B)? 
¶  How might the court take financing structures into account 
in approving settlements, such as under Rule 23(e) for federal 
class actions?38  
¶  How might the court take the financing structure into ac-
count in assigning attorneys’ fees and costs?39  
  
 35. Consider, for instance, that “the settlement agreement often contains an express 
term that defendants will not object to the plaintiffs’ lawyers fee application,” Jed S. 
Rakoff, Are Settlements Sacrosanct?, 37 LITIG. 15, 16 (Summer 2011).  
 36. Note that Rule 23 not only permits, but “require[s]” the court to consider “the 
resources that counsel will commit to representing the class” when appointing class coun-
sel.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(A)(iv).  It also permits the court to “consider any other matter 
pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class,” 
“order potential class counsel to provide information on any subject pertinent to the ap-
pointment,” and “make further orders in connection with the appointment.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(g)(1)(B), (C), (E). 
 37. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3), 78u-4(a)(3) (2006) (requiring appointment of the 
“most adequate plaintiff,” generally the investor with the greatest financial interest, as 
lead plaintiff in securities class actions). 
 38. As Judge Hellerstein has explained, in the context of his handling of the 9/ !11 
cases, it may take more finesse for a judge to demand changes to settlement terms in mass 
litigations not governed by Rule 23.  See Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 476–77.   
 39. The judge’s expanded role in regulating attorneys’ fees in class actions is familiar.  
See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 31, § 14.2 (offering guidance and 
citing extensive case law);  see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(2)(D) (in appointing class counsel, 
court “may include in the appointing order provisions about the award of attorneys’ fees”).  
Moreover, judicial authority to revise agreements on fee allocation has also been recog-
nized in the Rule 23 context; the Agent Orange case is a leading illustration.  See In re 
Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 218, 226 (2d Cir. 1987), rev’g 611 F. Supp. 
1452 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (reversing post hoc approval of undisclosed fee-sharing agreement 
among plaintiffs’ steering committee that would have provided certain committee mem-
bers a 300% return on their investment in the form of advances to pay litigation ex-
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¶  How would the use of these tools influence which forms of 
financing are favored in the first place?  How would such inter-
ventions affect the costs and availability of financing?40  
3. Comparison to Familiar Forms of Funding 
¶  How does the financing and control structure compare with 
subrogation to insurers, as is common on the defense side? 
¶  How does the funder’s stake compare with familiar forms of 
partial or total claim transfer, such as in patent or in bank-
ruptcy?   
¶  How does the funder’s stake compare with the de facto par-
tial claim transfer achieved by the typical contingency fee?41   
¶  How does the financing structure compare with co-counsel 
arrangements in which one law firm helps fund the litigation but 
exercises only minimal control?42  
¶  How does the financing structure differ from these more 
common analogues, in the existence or absence of fiduciary du-
ties?  Or in other ethical constraints?  How do they differ in the 
degree of control (formal or informal) over the conduct of litiga-
tion?  
¶  How might existing judicial tools and policies concerning 
these more familiar forms of litigation financing —? subrogation, 
claim transfers, contingency fees, and co-counsel financing —? 
also be applied or adapted to the newer forms of third-party fi-
nancing?  
  
penses); see also In re FPI/Agretech Sec. Litig., 105 F.3d 469, 473–76 (9th Cir. 1997) (per-
mitting district court to disturb fee allocation agreement among class co-counsel); Smiley 
v. Sincoff, 958 F.2d 498, 501 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting district courts’ broad discretion to “es-
tablish fee structures,” “determine . . . the method of computation of fees,” and “modify 
tentative fee agreements between the parties themselves, even if such agreements were 
arm’s length transactions”).  
 40. I thank Jack Coffee for useful conversations about the potential effects on ex ante 
pricing of the financing. 
 41. See Garber, supra note 2, at 18–19 (“[C]ontingency-fee lawyers have an inherent 
conflict of financial interest with their clients even without [alternative litigation financ-
ing] . . . . The more appropriate question, then, is whether [it] would exacerbate (rather 
than create) such conflicts of interest.”); see also Molot, supra note 2, at 90–92 (discussing 
attorney contingency fees as “[t]he principal market for litigation claims” in the United 
States). 
 42. Such an arrangement was successfully challenged in the Agent Orange litigation. 
See supra notes 14, 39. 
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C. CAN JUDGES HARNESS LITIGATION FINANCE?  
Finally, we should remember that there might actually be an 
upside to the rise of new forms of financing.  They may offer new 
solutions even to very old problems — offering further ways, for 
instance, for judges to ensure that class members are protected as 
Rule 23 requires.  
First, as Professor Coffee has noted, the right type of litigation 
financing could serve as an extra check on the system (for in-
stance, with the funder serving as a counterweight to class coun-
sel), just as the large institutional investors serving as lead plain-
tiff are expected to do in securities litigation under the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act.  This would be a system in 
which “agents are watching agents.”43   
Other possibilities are also imaginable:  for instance, litigation 
financing might supply a party with the funds it needs to hire its 
preferred counsel, such as one that does not operate on contin-
gency fees.44  Or, a litigation financing agreement requiring the 
assent of each plaintiff might in effect convert an opt-out class 
into an opt-in class, and thus one that is likely to be better in-
formed and possibly more involved in the class action’s govern-
ance.45  
I conclude, then, by turning our inquiry toward this possibility? 
— that the courts might seek not only to deflect some possible 
  
 43. Coffee, supra note 2, at 342 & n.173 (“A structure in which the class has both a 
class counsel and a separate litigation funder is inherently one in which ‘agents are 
watching agents.’” (citing Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Insti-
tutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 817–18 (1992))).  For an analysis of how 
such monitoring and shifting of ownership might work in non-class, mass litigation set-
tings, see Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation 6, 
(UGA Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1968961), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ ! 
sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=1968961  (analysis “focus[ing] on the unique dynamics of 
funding mass litigation that proceeds outside of a class action and explain[ing] how unit-
ing aggregate litigation with third-party financing can reduce agency costs”).  Cf. David 
Dana & Max Schanzenbach, How Would Third Party Financing Change the Face of 
American Tort Litigation?  The Role of Agency Costs in the Attorney-Client Relationship, 
NW. L. SEARLE CTR. ON L., REG., & ECON. GROWTH (Sept. 14 2009), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/ !!!searlecenter/ !!papers/  
Schanzenbach_Agency%20Costs.pdf.  
 44. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.   
 45. See Hensler, supra note 2, at 321 (“Third-party funding in Australia has had the 
practical effect of converting an opt-out class action procedure to an opt-in procedure be-
cause financing firms require each class member to contract with them.”); Picker, supra 
note 25 (elaborating on the argument). 
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effects of litigation financing, but also to harness others.  Could 
the careful design of financing structures be used to improve rep-
resentation for class members?  Which arrangements will tend to 
create better monitoring or improve transparency?  What might a 
court, the judiciary, or rule-makers do to promote these beneficial 
designs?  
